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ABSTRACT
The goal of this thesis is to provide an adequate answer to the question of how
domestic politics affect foreign policy, specifically examining Spain’s refusal to
recognize Kosovo as an independent nation because of the Basque independence
movement within its own borders. By examining the various aspects of domestic politics,
including the election of officials, as well as the historical context of the political
situation in both Spain and Kosovo, the question is answered. Foreign policy decisions

are made based on the process of domestic politics. Spain refused to acknowledge
Kosovo’s independence for fear that the Basques might separate in return.
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Introduction
On February 17, 2008, the world listened as cheers of excitement echoed through
the halls of Kosovo’s government building. The nation had just declared its independence
from Serbia, a monumental and historic occasion. For years Kosovars suffered under the
rule of Slobodan Milosevic, and finally, they had set themselves free.

Many countries

across the world offered their congratulations to the new state in the form of formal
recognition, some anxiously awaiting the opportunity to establish relations with the new
state. For other nations, however, Kosovo’s cheers were not heard; these states only heard

Serbia’s cry, the shrilling cry that came from the nation that had just experienced great
loss. Spain heard Serbia’s cry and offered its condolences to the nation, refusing to
recognize Kosovo’s independence.
Spain mourned with Serbia, as the threat of a heartbreaking loss, the loss of
territory, proved to be a very real possibility. The Basques, much like the Kosovars,
suffered under the Spanish dictator Francisco Franco, surrendering their autonomy only
to be governed by Spain, a nation few Basques claimed as their own. As Basques are
desperate for complete autonomy from Spain, Spain is desperate to keep their prized
territory united with the rest of the country. While the Basques claim not to need Spain,
Spain needs the Basques, as the Basques bolster the economy and add another dimension
to traditional Spanish culture. On February 17, 2008, the Spanish government feared for
the worst; the state watched as nations across the world eagerly acknowledged Kosovo’s
status as a newly independent nation. Spain worried that a precedent would be set, a

precedent that would someday allow their beloved Basque country to become an
independent nation as well.
Kosovo’s independence caught the world’s attention, and Spain’s reaction proved
to be one of the most interesting outcomes of the historic event. Spain refused to
acknowledge Kosovo’s independence because of the separatist movement lurking within
its own borders. Specifically, my research question asks how the Basque independence
movement affected Spain’s refusal to acknowledge Kosovo’s independence. More
generally, my research question asks how domestic politics, the election of officials and
the constituencies of those officials, affect a state’s foreign policy. There are many
approaches that can be used to address these questions.
Domestic policy and foreign policy are interconnected; however, the degree to
which these two seemingly different areas are connected is often unknown. In this paper,
I will theorize about the relationship between domestic policy and foreign policy as it
regards the issue of formal state recognition of foreign independence movements.

In

doing so, I will argue that a nation’s domestic policy determines its foreign policy.
Existing political theories and philosophies do not adequately provide for the Spain’s
reaction to Kosovo’s independence. Realism and liberalism are two commonly examined
political philosophies; however, neither fully explains Spain’s reaction to Kosovo’s
independence and neither is able to explain how domestic policy and foreign policy are
related.
Realism assumes that the international system is anarchic; the international
system is governed by a set of rules set by states without an enforcement mechanism. The

principal actors in the eyes of the realist are the states; international organizations have
little effect on the international community. The realist assumes that each state is rational

and focused on national interests only. This assumption creates an international system
that is void of trust, and alliances are created to further national interests only. Each state
is desperate to survive, and realists rely on military power to ensure and explain that
survival. Only with a strong military and watchful eye on national security do realists
believe that nations will prevail in the international system.
Realism relies on the anarchy of the international community to explain how
domestic policy affects foreign policy. In realism, states work to protect their own
national security interests primarily through the exercise of military power. Domestic
policy decisions are often made without regard to a state’s internal military capability,
Realism does not adequately answer how domestic policy and foreign policy are related,
because the theory relies on the use of military power. In the case of Spain and Kosovo,
military capability was never the issue. Kosovo and Spain are located thousands of miles
apart, and therefore, neither is a threat to the other’s national security. Because of this,

realism cannot satisfy the question of how domestic policy affects foreign policy in this
case. Realism assumes that states are unitary and each pursues distinct national interests.
Spain is not a unitary actor, as the Basque country is a part of Spain, a part that wants to
act separately from Spain. In short, realism ignores domestic politics completely. The
case of Spain and Kosovo, under the theory of realism, is one that would not even be

studied. Should I find convincing evidence for my theory, this evidence will also support

those who disagree with realism’s rigid view of unitary states who act out of consistent
unitary self interest which is driven by the power structure of the international system.
Liberalism, unlike realism, argues that cooperation is possible in the international
system. States act out of preferences rather than out of capability; states make decisions
based on what they prefer to do rather than what they are militarily or economically
capable of doing. According to liberals, international organizations play a strong role in
the interactions of states within the international community. Liberalism provides a
means for peace, as Immanuel Kant detailed in his work “Perpetual Peace” (Kant, 1795).
Kant describes an international system in which peace is a possibility using his three
pillars of peace: democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations.
Historically, democracies have not fought wars with one another, economic

interdependence generally prevents war, and international organizations provide arenas
for diplomatic relations between countries.
In democracies, citizens are free therefore, these citizens are not anxious to
eliminate the freedom of others, and as a result, democracies have not fought wars with

one another. War results in the loss of freedom. If countries are economically
interdependent, they are less likely to start a war among themselves. War only assures
economic destruction of all countries involved, and therefore, economic interdependence

generally prevents war. International organizations establish and enforce rules within the
international system, and as a result, these organizations encourage countries to work
together diplomatically by providing guidance and assistance. International organizations
provide opportunities for countries to work together in a diplomatic manner; therefore,

drastically reducing the possibility for war. Domestic and foreign policy are, therefore,
created from the desire for peace under one of the three pillars.
Liberalism relies heavily on the interaction of nations to explain the cooperation

between states. The effect of domestic policy on foreign policy is only explained through
the cooperation of states. States’ preferences dictate which nations interact; however,

neither completely explains how a state’s domestic policy affects foreign policy
decisions. The theory of liberalism does not adequately describe the relationship between
domestic policy and foreign policy as it makes the wrong predictions. One would assume
that international institutions, like the European Union, would have encouraged Spain to
cooperate and support Kosovo’s independence. Liberalism also argues that democracies
tend to cooperate with each other; however, Spain did not cooperate with the other

democracies that chose to recognize Kosovo’s independence. Economic interdependence
also tends to yield to cooperation, and Spain is reliant on the rest of Europe; however,
Spain still refused to acknowledge Kosovo’s independence. Liberalism, although a strong
theory, does not adequately answer the question of how a state’s domestic politics affect
its foreign policy.
Neither liberalism nor realism adequately describes the relationship between
domestic and foreign policy. Nations often look inward before acting outward. In order to
remain in office, elected officials must be reelected. Officials will not be elected or
reelected if they do not please their constituents. Domestic independence movements are
not uncommon, and in the countries in which they exist, these movements tend to be
important electoral issues. Nations desire to maintain territorial integrity and will,

therefore, go to great lengths to ensure that this integrity remains intact. Because nations
want to maintain their territorial integrity, any challenges to this integrity are taken very
seriously within the government. Separatist movements, movements that challenge the
territorial integrity of the state, tend to be very important electoral issues. In a democracy,
officials will not be reelected if they support the separatist movement. A government’s
first priority is to its people, and if the elected officials wish to stay in office, they will
abide by the will and wishes of the people. Because officials want to remain in power,
any domestic separatist movement becomes an issue that affects foreign policy decisions.
The effect that domestic policy has on foreign policy is an important aspect to
understand in political science. Scholars desire to know how and why countries act and
react in specific ways. By examining the relationship between domestic and foreign
policy, only then can one understand how and why countries behave as they do in their
foreign relations with one another. If a country has a domestic separatist movement, the
country is less likely to support the independence of foreign independence movements, so
as to prevent giving legitimacy to the independence movement within its own borders. As
additional states recognize the legitimacy of the primary country’s separatist movements,
international pressure could potentially give way to the independence of additional
independence movements, something states with domestic separatist movements wish to
avoid at all costs. This is important to understand, as it gives governments the ability to
predict how allies and enemies will react in the international community.
My research shows that the domestic policies of states affect the foreign policies
that they choose to pursue. In this sense, foreign policy and domestic policy are not

independent policy realms. Rather, they are closely related to
one another, with foreign
policy commonly following from the preferences of domestic
constituencies. Spain made
a foreign policy decision, choosing not to recognize Kosovo’s
independence, based upon
its domestic policy decision not to grant independence to the Basqu
e country. Spain,

however, was not alone in its decision making. Russia and Greece also
chose not to
recognize Kosovo based in part upon their domestic policies. Domestic politic
s is thus
often the driver of foreign policy decision making, as demonstrated
in the case of the
Spanish Basque country in relation to the independence of Kosovo
. In the following

pages, I will detail my theory as well as provide the proper historical contex
t and
background for the Basque independence movement and Kosovo’s path to independence.

Chapter I: Theory
According to the definition of democracy, the people elect the government.
Democracies, unlike other forms of government, require citizen participation. Citizens
elect officials. The nation as a body of individuals decides who will represent them in the
government. In autocracies, the head of government is not popularly elected. Rather,
autocrats maintain power and make decisions at the behest of a small minority of people.
The citizens are not involved in the autocrat's decision making process. One official or
one group of officials makes decisions that affect the entire nation, without concern for
the very people living inside the state's borders. Because citizens are not involved in the
electoral process, most officials are not afraid of being removed from office by the
people.
The assumption is that officials within democracies wish to stay in office. In order
for elected officials to achieve their goals, they must be in office. Officials are powerless
if they do not hold a position within the government. Those people who are not selected
to serve in the government are merely regular citizens. If officials still want to impact
society, they must hold an elected office; therefore, while not always the case, the

assumption is that these representatives wish to remain in office is largely true.
Elections are held in democracies. During these set times, the citizens participate
in the governmental process. The people vote for the person they believe best represents
their personal beliefs, the individual they believe will be the best leader. The citizens, the

populace, decide who will serve in the government. Government officers cannot assume

positions unless the citizens want them to serve in office. Officials are elected by the
people they represent. The desires of these people, or constituents, is of importance to the
representatives they elect. While serving in the government, officials are expected to
support the wants and desires of their constituencies. As a representative of the people,

officials are supportive of these desires.
In order to be reelected, officials must please their voting constituency. If an
elected official acts in a manner counter to the desires of his constituents, he will not be
reelected. Should an official wish to be reelected, he must value the wants and desires of
his constituency; however he must also be able to balance those wants with what is best
for the government, for the state, as a whole. This is the population he represents and the
citizens who support him. Just as the people need elected officials to carry out the
business of government, elected officials need the people's support in order to maintain
their position in the government. Pleasing a constituency can require representatives to
support a variety of issues and causes, some of which they may not personally support.
Because they are elected to represent their constituents, the voters, supporting the desires
of these people may require bureaucrats to balance their personal wants with those of the
populace they represent. Supporting an official's own desire does not get him reelected;
however, providing for the desires of his constituency will get him reelected. Ultimately,
an official's constituency determines who will serve in the government.
Separatist movements, or independence movements, are critical issues in those

states in which one exists and can play a large role in the election process. These
movements destabilize peace in a country. Independence movements, made up of those

wishing to leave the current governmental structure, lead to unrest within a nation. These

people tend to identify themselves as outsiders, those who do not fit within the mold of
the current system. Separatist movements seek to change the current government order by
removing themselves from the old system in order to create a new system, a system that
provides for total sovereignty. The new system is not one that the current government
supports. The separatists use various tactics to get the attention of the government
officials. These tactics often include protests, violence, and even armed rebellion. There

are many ongoing separatist movements throughout the world; the problem is not unique
to one particular country or part of the world. The perpetrators of these movements
acknowledge those on the same mission in other countries. Separatists watch how each
state addresses the movements within its own country. While officials need to
acknowledge the tactics of the separatist movement within their own state, governments
should not formally recognize the movement.
Should a government choose to recognize a foreign independence movement,
legitimacy is then given to any existing domestic independence movements. While each
government decides individually how to address the issue of domestic independence
movements, governments often do not allow separatists to gain total sovereignty and
independence. The consequences of giving separatists total sovereignty can be costly,
both within the nation and across international borders. Those leading separatist
movements create a rift in the nationalist notion of a country. Any time a group wants to
separate from the mother country, nationalism within the country as a whole is weakened,
and the unity of the country is fractured.
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The loss of nationalism is not the only way in which the radicals disrupt the unity
of anation. States generally have economic interests within the separatists territory. If a
separatist movement gains sovereignty, the state's economy is weakened. A state's
economy is a central issue within a government, as greater economic power is highly

correlated with constituent satisfaction with the government domestically and the state's
influence in the international community.

Therefore, governments would not want to

give total sovereignty to an independence movement, especially when that movement
threatens the secession of economically valuable territory.
Many officials and citizens value the territorial integrity of their state; separatists'
movements act counter to that integrity by demanding that borders be changed. This
creates friction between the state and groups within the state. A country's international
presence, its power on an international scale, is greater if those living within the country
are united. If the people within a nation are divided by a separatist movement, the
government loses the ability to influence other nations in the international community, as
a divided nation is one in disarray.
The international community and the pressures associated with that community
are also reasons not to give legitimacy to the separatist movements. International
organizations play a role in governing the global system. These organizations have
influence over the choices made by member and non-member states. The means of which
international organizations influence states are often through economic measures.
International organizations can dictate how a state responds to both domestic and foreign
independence movements; however, if the issue is a critical electoral issue as is the case

11

for independence movements, government officials will give precedence to domestic
interests over pressure from the international community.
Any acknowledgement of a foreign independence movement gives validity to a
domestic movement. Separatists are trying to gain sovereignty and legitimacy. These two
aspects can be attained by the recognition of a similar, foreign movement. If a state
should choose to recognize an independence movement outside of its borders, the
independence movement within its own borders suddenly has traction. By examining the
tactics of the foreign independence movement, the domestic movement will apply the
same principles to its own movement, in hopes of increasing its chances for total
government recognition. If a state recognizes a foreign independence movement for
specific reasons, this raises the risk that the same state will be pressured to recognize its
domestic independence movement should those same tactics be used. Any
acknowledgement of a foreign independence movement by a government implies the
state's willingness to grant sovereignty to any independence movement, including those
within its borders.

The recognition of one domestic independence movement will lead to spin-off
movements, other groups hoping to attain greater sovereignty from a government that
clearly allows for such ideas. A country can refuse to give legitimacy to the independence
movement within its borders; however, validating the independence movement of another
country counters the illegitimacy of the movement within its borders. Recognizing
foreign independence movements gives an unspoken validation to the domestic
independence movement, as independence movements are connected. Those leading
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independence movements within countries pay careful attention to the similar movements
around the world thus the validation of one independence movement is a validation of all
independence movements. Those longing for sovereignty, although often located across
the world, are connected by this desire, and thus, once one movement begins the quest for
total sovereignty, others start to follow. Independence movements, domestic and foreign,
can be critical electoral issues.
If a domestic independence movement exists and is an important electoral issue,
and if the voting constituency is clearly against independence, then leaders who wish to
stay in office will want to please this majority by making domestic and foreign policies to

that end. Separatist movements cause disruption within a country. Citizens outside of
these independence movements often do not support these movements. Many separatists
use violence as a tool to get attention or recognition from the government. Citizens do not

want violence within their lands. These movements create tension within a country, as the
independence movement tends to act against those supporting the government. It can be
assumed that people want peace and stability within their own country and with the

presence of separatist movements, those wants cannot be achieved.

The desires of the

voters dictate who they elect. In order to remain in government, the officials must make
policies that acknowledge the desires of the people. Because citizens are averse to the

detriments of independence movements and the consequences that acknowledging those
movements will have, officials face great pressure to avoid recognizing independence
movements in foreign countries.
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In order to avoid lending legitimacy to the domestic movement and
thus losing
electoral support, leaders in countries with domestic independence
movements will
choose not to support the radical factions in other countries. By ignoring the
desires of
the independence movements across the world, officials are also ignori
ng the wants of

their domestic movements. If the Separatist movements do not
receive legitimacy from
the government, the citizens will continue to reelect those already serving in office. When
the desires of the voters are met, officials are reelected. In this sense, domestic politics
affects foreign politics.
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Chapter II- Evidence: Historical Context, Spain
Basque Separatists in Spain
From the Bay of Biscay and just to the west of Aragon, lies a portion of Spain and
France that is home to one of the world's oldest peoples, the Basques (Reference Map
#2). The Basque Country is located in northern Spain, along the Atlantic Coastline,

encompassing a small portion of southwest France as well (Reference Map #1)
(Kurlansky 1999). The inhabitants of this land, specifically their origins, are largely
unknown to most of the world. Scholars and historians alike are mystified by this unique

group of people, as Lewy D'Abartiague eloquently wrote in his 1896 study of the
Basques,

"This people is perhaps the only one in the world, at the least, the only one in
Europe,.whose origin remains absolutely unknown. It is strange to think at the end
of the 19th century, which has been so fertile on the subject of origins, that these
few people still remain a mystery" qtd in Kurlansky 1999

The people are as unique to Spain as the green terrain in which they live is to the arid
desert of the Spanish meseta. Their cuisine is world renowned and a treasured aspect of

their livelihood. The flavors and use of the fruit of the sea are distinguishable. In fact, the
food alone attracts visitors to the least visited location in Spain. The Basques are an
exceptional people, one that unlike other populations across the globe, has not allowed
the evolution of society to impact the very essence of their culture.
The Basques are thought to be the oldest people in Europe. Their skulls and
skeletal structure have been traced back to Cro-Magnon, the oldest form of man (Collins
15

1986). Adding to the Basque claim as Europe's oldest people is genetics, specifically
blood type. The Basque population contains a higher percentage of O negative blood than
any other demographic in the world (Kurlansky, 1999). The original man, Cro-Magnon,
shared this blood type. Because written records of the original Basques do not exist, the

people only have the artifacts of the past to prove their existence extends beyond that of
other Europeans.

Settled in the coastal corner of northeast Spain to the south of the Pyrenees, the
Basques have remained an isolated culture with a unique language. The language is one
of the society's most recognized characteristics. Euskara, or the language of the Basques,
is one of the oldest languages in the world, if not the oldest. The origins of Euskara are
largely unknown; however, scholars have been able to find slight similarities between the
language of the Basques and the Aquitania language which is found sporadically in the
early days of Christianity (Clark 1986). Not all words are strictly derived from Basque;
other languages have influenced the creation of the newer words to allow the language to
keep up with the modern world. With its strange sounds and wide use of 'x's and 'k's, the
language proves to be a very intimidating and difficult one for outsiders to learn, and as
globalization reaches every corner of the earth, fewer and fewer are attempting to speak
it. Euskara has approximately 250,000 speakers worldwide, most of whom dwell in the
Basque country. The Basques themselves take pride in their language, something that
survived the Roman Empire's reign and Franco's oppression. The language is what
separates the Basques from the rest of the world; it is what makes them Basque, as the
direct translation of Euskara is "one who is Basque" (Kurlansky 1999).
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The Basque language and origin have created a people that value their
nationalism. Throughout most of their history, Spain's oldest people have enjoyed a great
deal of autonomy. Spain has traditionally respected the fact that the Basque Country and
several other territories existed long before the Iberian Peninsula was ever christened
"Espafia", and thus, the national government has granted extended rights and governing
privileges to these areas. While this has been the case through much of Spanish history,
one leader believed in a unified Spain, one Spain, a Spain without autonomous
communities. Francisco Franco, the infamous dictator of Spain, constrained and restricted
the Basques and their culture (Perez Fernandez & Hernando, 2004).
Reasons for Movement

Franco ruled over Spain from 1939 until his death in 1975. While in power, he
restricted the use of Euskara; he suppressed the culture. And most importantly, he
outlawed autonomous communities. For the Basque Country, this was devastating. After
centuries of self rule with little Spanish involvement, their nation was being destroyed,
infiltrated by the government of a foreign people that most Basques did not claim as their

brethren. As a result of Franco's despotism, the Basques rebelled. The rebellion came in
the form of a group most commonly known as ETA, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, translated
as Basque Country and Freedom (Heywood, 1999).
ETA was founded in 1959 by college-age, middle-class men from la Universidad

de Deusto in Bilbao, Spain. The men were angry with the Partido Nacionalista Vasco, the
Basque nationalist party, and the group's reaction to Franco's oppression. Wishing to take
a greater stance against the dictator than their predecessors, the men formed ETA. The
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founders of the organization never intended for it to expand as it did; in fact, their
organization started out much like other college groups across the world start, one in

reaction to the injustices of the day. Violence was never a thought of the original
members; they were merely advocates for their homeland and their culture, an identity

Franco attempted to eradicate during his tenure as dictator. Scholars and historians alike

have attempted to answer the question of ETA’s move from a nonviolent organization to
the terrorism that now defines them across the world.

The ideological principles of ETA

are founded in Basque nationalism, anti-colonialism, and radical socialism. ETA

experienced a

transition after the death of Franco; the group became a terrorist

organization, one desperate for the total sovereignty it possessed centuries ago. During
the 1970s, the group began to push for great independence, and in 1973, assassinated the

President of the Spanish government, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco. The late 1970s were
violent, as ETA killed an average of 100 people each year. As Spain adjusted to the
Constitution of 1978 and the Basque Country regained their former status as an
autonomous community, ETA's violent killings were fewer and farther apart (Clark, The
Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980, 1984).

The Spanish government criticized the group, and as the country became more
democratic in its ways, others began to condemn ETA's use of violence as a means to
achieve seemingly unachievable goals. In 1998, ETA called for a ceasefire. All of their

current desires had been met, and the more lofty goals, like total sovereignty, could wait
until later. The ceasefire ended in 1999 after the Spanish government refused to discuss

the possibility of complete Basque independence. Spain entered into the new millenniurr
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with little fear of the Basque Country's terrorist organization; however, with the Madrid
bombings in 2004, the government assumed ETA as the perpetrator. Spain was wrong,
and later evidence revealed that another terrorist organization was to blame. Once again
in 2006, ETA called for a ceasefire. The group promised that this one would be
permanent; however, as nationalism swelled within the greenest areas of Spain, the latest
ceasefire was also called off in August of 2007. In recent weeks and months, ETA has

continued to terrorize Spain as the Basque desire for independence grows stronger and
stronger (BBC, 2008).

In 1976, Spain established a democracy within its borders. After years under the
oppression of Francisco Franco, Spain was finally free to establish a government that
would be for the people, by the people. The early stages of the democracy were difficult,
as a constitution needed to be written. By 1978, the new Constitution was ready. The

Constitution of 1978 provides for a parliamentary monarchy system. The king, Juan
Carlos I, serves as the symbolic head of state. His duties and powers are limited, as the

head of government, the Prime Minister, serves as the policy maker (Marco, 2006).
Spanish Democratic Process

Spain's government consists of the monarch, the executive branch, the legislative
branch, and the judicial branch. The monarch is hereditary. The executive branch, or the
Council of Ministers, is comprised of the Prime Minister, the deputy Prime Minister, and

other ministers, who serve in a capacity similar to that of the American President's
Cabinet. The Council of Ministers is the ultimate policy making body within the Spanish
government. The legislative branch is bicameral with the Senate being the upper house
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and the Council of Deputies being the lower house. The judicial branch consists of the

Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. Each autonomous community has its own
Parliament and government. The autonomous communities are self-governing within the
Spanish Parliamentary system, as each individual Parliament governs its respective
autonomous community (The Spanish Electoral System- Historical Accident).
The electoral system of Spain is a detailed, complex system of rules and
regulations put into place shortly after the creation of the Constitution of 1978. The
Senate consists of 257 Senators 208 of those members are directly elected by the general
population with four seats being automatically given to each province. The remaining
forty-nine members are indirectly elected by the parliaments of the seventeen
autonomous communities. According to the Electoral Law, voters may select three
candidates when voting. The Council of Deputies has 350 members. Two seats are given
to each province with an additional seat given for every 144,500 inhabitants or for any
fraction over 70,000 inhabitants. According to Spanish electoral law, a party must receive
at least three percent of the vote to be represented in either chamber of Congress (Solsten
& Meditz, 1988).
While both houses of the legislature may write and pass legislation, each chamber
has specific duties. The Council of Deputies, the lower house, has the ultimate legislative
authority. The Deputies have the power over the executive branch, including the authority
to vote a Prime Minister out of office with a motion of censure or a vote of confidence.

This power serves as a check on the Prime Minister, thus keeping the power within the
hands of the people. The Senate, the upper house, controls the autonomous communities.
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This branch monitors the legislative actions of each community’s parliament. Should a

community act against the Constitution of 1978, the Senate may punish the community.
Problems arise when an autonomous community acts against the will of Spain (Solsten &
Meditz, 1988).
The Constitution of 1978 provides for universal, direct suffrage. Much like in the

United States, all voters must be at least eighteen years of age. Only convicted criminals
and public servants are prevented from voting. Voters may include any resident of the
European Union who currently lives in Spain, as an Electoral Census is completed before
each election. All voting must be done by secret, paper ballot. By law, the polls must be
open from 9am until 8pm on Election Day, even if all those on the eligible voter roster
have voted. When voters go to select officials, they only see a party list. Spain follows
the party list system of voting. Only the party and the party leader are listed on the ballot,
with the exception of Senate races. In Senate races, voters see a multiparty list and may
select up to three candidates. Elections for every office are held every four years. The
Parliament elections within the autonomous communities are held at the same time as the
general government elections with the exception of the three historic communities. The
historic communities may hold their elections at any time. Ultimately, the Spanish
Parliament has the authority to create and establish electoral law and rules under Article
VIII of the Constitution of 1978 (The Spanish Electoral System- Historical Accident).
While most Senators and Deputies are directly elected by the people, the Prime
Minister is not. He is appointed by the king. The Prime Minister is leader of the dominant
political party. His party has the majority in both houses of the legislature; however, he
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still must be nominated by the king (Marco 2006). After being nominated by the king, the
Prime Minister must receive a vote of investiture by an absolute majority of the Congress
of Deputies before he can take office. The Prime Minister must resign if his party loses
the majority in the legislature, thus creating a system in which the Prime Minister truly
must represent the desires of the people of Spain. He must also resign if he loses a vote of
confidence or the Council of Deputies approves a motion of censure (Solsten & Meditz,
1988).
Autonomous Communities

Within the Constitution of 1978, Spain provides for Comunidades Autonomias, or
Self-governing Communities. Currently, there are seventeen Comunidades Autonomias
with three of these specified as historic nationalities. Euskadi, Galicia, and Catalufia are

the three historic nationalities within Spain, and while the further distinction does not
grant the governments additional powers, each community possesses a nationalism not
found in the other fourteen states. While a part of Spain, these traditionally historical
communities are given the right to provide for those living within their borders. Each
community is given a certain degree of autonomy, and the Spanish Constitution provides
for this autonomy in Part Eight, Section Three. The Spanish government gives these areas
a greater degree of freedom from the monarchy in Spain; however, Article 145
specifically forbids these communities from becoming federations and separating from
the crown.

A constitution details the various duties, expectations, and powers of the various
branches of government; it provides rights and protections for citizens. A constitution
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governs how leaders and citizens must act within a country's borders. Part Nine of the
Spanish Constitution of 1978 provides for the Constitutional Court, a group of twentyfour members whose sole duty is to rule on any seemingly unconstitutional act. The
document that sets a standard for officials when working within its borders might also set
a standard for officials when working outside of its borders. A country's interpretation of

its constitution might affect its foreign policy decisions.
Part Nine, Article 161 of the Constitution of 1978 gives the Constitutional Court
the power to hear any case concerning the conflict of jurisdiction between the Selfgoverning communities and the State. According to the Spanish Constitution, selfgoverning communities do not have the right to separate from Spain. The Autonomous
Communities, specifically the Basque Country, have played a vital role in Spanish history
and economy. Much of Spain’s wealth and resources exist within these seventeen areas;
however, the Basque Country possesses more of these than the other communities. From
as early as the fifteenth century, the Basques were the gem of Spain’s economy. The
small green plot of land tucked away next to the Pyrenees produced and supplied a
gracious plenty of iron to Europe. Some sources cite that the tiny area of Viscaya, a
province within the Basque Country, produced upwards of one third of Europe’s iron
(Kurlansky 1999). As the centuries progressed, the Basques continued to buoy Spain’s
economy. By Franco’s death in 1975, the Basque economy, the Basque industry, proved
to be one of the few aspects of the Spanish economy to have survived the dictator’s
disastrous decades of rule. The GDP of the Basque was ten percent above the average of
the European Community (Hooper, 1987). The wealth of the Basque Country alone is
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enough to discourage politicians in Madrid from granting the Basque Parliament’s

request for total sovereignty.
Throughout history the Basques have remained one of the wealthiest areas of
Spain, although the topography and availability of certain natural resources might lead
some to think otherwise. The green mountains filled with the minerals needed to produce
steel and the proximity to the Atlantic Ocean made the land of Europe’s oldest people the
perfect location for industry. For reasons sociologists can only speculate about, the
Basques have consistently been able to take advantage of the world market well before

the rest of Spain, and as a result, what industries do exist have been able to prosper. With
the increasing violence of ETA in addition to an aging population, the GDP of the Basque
Country has dropped in the recent decade; however, because of the strong industrial
sector, the GDP of the Basque Country was still well above the GDP of Spain. In 2005,
the GDP per capita in euros of the Basque Country was approximately 26,399.60 as
compared to the 20,863.90 euro GDP of Spain (Churiaque, 2006).
Simply put, Spain needs the Basque Country, if only for economic reasons. The
country as a whole will suffer if the Basques receive total sovereignty. Even as additional
factors negatively affect the GDP of the Basque Country, the Basques continue to rank as
one of Spain’s greenest, economically successful, regions. In addition to economics, the

Basque Country provides Spain with access to the busier ports on the Atlantic coastline
like Bilbao. The Spanish surfing city of San Sebastian, an area that draws surfers and
tourists from across the world, also lies within the green landscape. Because Spain
cannot afford to lose the Basque Country to independence, the Constitution of 1978 gives
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the Autonomous Communities the authority to govern themselves within the bounds of
the larger Spanish government.
The Basque Country’s desire to create a sovereign nation free from Spanish
control has proven to be a proverbial thorn in the side of the government. From its
creation in 1959 until the present, ETA, the Basque nationalist group uses terrorism to
spread it message, continues to cause unrest in Madrid. In order to quell the violence and

the attention given to this particular separatist movement, the Spanish Constitutional
Court has outlawed every move by the Basques to gain total sovereignty, including the
recent push for a referendum that would give the state the opportunity to achieve total
sovereignty from Spain.
Zapatero’s Election
In 2000, José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero ran for the head of the Spanish Socialist
Workers’ Party. He ran on a ticket that promoted a new age for Spain; Zapatero’s
campaign was the Nueva Via. After serving as the General Secretary of the Spanish
Socialist Workers’ Party for several years, the party won the majority of the seats in the
Congress and Zapatero was appointed Prime Minister of Spain. The 2004 election proved
to be historic, as polls across Spain predicted the People’s Party, the party of the Prime
Minister, would win the election. On March 11, 2004, a mere three days before the

election campaign was to begin, early morning blasts rang out in Madrid. 191 people
were killed during the morning commute, and as a result, the campaigns were suspended.
Both the People’s Party and Zapatero released a statement, blaming ETA for the
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atrocious attacks. After further investigation, the Spanish government learned that the
bombings were not of the works of the separatists within their own land but of terrorists
from another. This truth was not discovered, however, until after the People’s Party

published a claim against ETA (Madrigal, 2004).
March 14, 2004, Election Day, arrived. Because of the attacks, no campaigning
took place, and Spaniards, from Bilbao to Sevilla, were in a state of mourning, although

not a unified one. Much to the surprise of pollsters, Zapatero’s Socialist Party claimed
164 seats, while the People’s Party only took 148. The Madrid bombings, particularly the
hasty response from the People’s Party, may have influenced the election’s outcome.
Many voters, outraged by the People’s Party’s reaction to the bombings, gave their

support to Zapatero, hoping that Zapatero would be willing to investigate the action to
give justice to those who perished. Regardless, the Spanish government switched parties,
moving from the People’s Party to the Socialist Party (José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero,

2008).
Zapatero entered the Spanish government with an agenda, and fortunately for him
and his party, he has had some success. After taking office, he immediately removed all

Spanish troops from Iraq. Zapatero increased the minimum wage and fought hard for the
Dependency Law, a program similar to the American Welfare System, one that provides
basic medical care and food for those who cannot provide it for themselves. Much to the
dismay of the Catholic Church, Zapatero legalized gay marriage. In the wake of the
Madrid bombings, although ETA was not the perpetrator, Zapatero also took a strong
stance against any and all terrorism, specifically ETA. In March of 2006, the Spanish
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government seemed to have reached an agreement with the Basque country’s most
notable group, as a “permanent” ceasefire was declared. Once the truce was declared,

Zapatero promised to have Congress negotiate with ETA to end their years of violence

(Perez Fernandez & Hernando, 2004).
Zapatero’s luck changed, however, in late December of 2006 when ETA declared

the end of the ceasefire with a bombing at Madrid’s Barajas Airport. The news was
devastating to Spain, as the previous nine months had been a nice reprieve from the years
of terror caused by ETA. In response to ETA’s antics in Madrid, Zapatero ended all
negotiations with the group. ETA claimed that Zapatero and the Spanish government
were working too slowly; ETA wanted independence for the Basque country as soon as

possible. By June of 2007 after Zapatero ended all possible talks, the group published
their official statement, ending the once thought to be permanent ceasefire. With the
official end of hostilities came a new era of ETA violence, one in which bombings,

terrorist attacks, were more frequent. During his first term as Prime Minister, Zapatero
attempted something few before him ever had, a diplomatic relationship with the
country’s most terrifying individuals, ETA.
With the official ETA ceasefire ending only months before and the memory of the
2004 Madrid bombing, Election Day 2008 seemed daunting at first. Zapatero’s popularity
remained high, and many Spaniards were pleased with his agenda and ruling style. ETA
was the only group that didn’t appreciate Zapatero’s policies, and as a result, attempted to
influence the elections. The 2008 elections were scheduled for March 9, 2008, and on

March 7, ETA attacked. This time the group killed a politician from the Socialist
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Workers’ Party, Zaptero’s Party. For the second election in a row, the Spanish
government suspended campaigning. As a result of his popularity, Zapatero was reelected
(Madrigal, 2004).
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Chapter III- Evidence- Historical Context, Kosovo
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. The action

was monumental as Kosovo has spent much of the last twenty years in the midst of
conflict. Serbia’s claim of Kosovo can be traced back as far as 1389 at the Battle of
Kosovo. While the Serbs lost the battle to the Ottoman Empire, the event itself has
become an essential part of the nation’s history, and during the centuries of Ottoman mule,
the battle of Kosovo kept the hope of reunification with Kosovo alive in Serbia (Malcolm
1998). Under Ottoman rule, little conflict existed between Kosovo and Serbia; however,

in 1912 the First Balkan War began as the Ottoman Empire deteriorated. The war of the
Balkan League nations of Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Greece against the Ottoman
Empire proved to be unique, as the allied nations fought as individual states rather than a
unified front. The Balkan League states established different fronts across the Ottoman
Empire, with Serbia and Montenegro’s efforts centered in Kosovo (Hall 2000). By 1913
at the end of the Second Balkan War, Serbia occupied Kosovo, an area most Serbs

considered part of their homeland.
Formerly part of Serbia, Kosovo lies in a part of the world that has been battered,
bruised, and at times, decimated by decades of war (Reference Map #3). Situated just to

the south of Serbia and just to the north of Albania, Kosovo’s geographic position has
made it not only the crossroads of the Balkan Peninsula but also the center of some of the

bloodiest conflicts in recent decades. Kosovo’s population consists primarily of ethnic
Albanians; however, Serbians account for a smaller proportion of the population living
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within the new nation’s borders (BBC 2008). Within the region formerly known as
Yugoslavia exists a plethora of ethnicities and a multitude of cultures.
Culture gives citizens of particular nations an identity, and in the case of the
Balkan nations, a reason to rid their states of those with differing ethnicities, religious
beliefs, languages, and lifestyles. While the in-depth history of the Balkans extends for
centuries, the origins of the most recent conflicts can be traced to the recent decades,

beginning with the origins of World War I. The first Great War began with the
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, by
Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip, a member of the Serbian militant group called Cma Ruka
or “Black Hand.” Ferdinand’s assassination proved that ethnic tensions were rising, and
subsequently, retaliation ensued from the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Hupchick 2002).
The Austro-Hungarian Hapsburgs were merely attempting to punish the Serbs for
the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand when German Kaiser William II vowed to
support any action taken against Serbia. As a result, military mobilization began, and on
July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia (Hupchick 2002). The

interconnected web of alliances and allegiances caused a domino effect to take place,
until finally what was once the conflict between two nations became a great war, the First
World War. The Paris Peace Conference, held in 1919, redrew the boundaries of the
Eastern world, including the borders of Balkan states. The Paris Peace Conference laid
the framework for the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, what would later become

known as Yugoslavia in 1929 under King Alexander I (Sowards 2004). Yugoslavia
continued to struggle during the next decade as World War II decimated Europe.
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By 1945 Yugoslavia had a new leader, Josip Broz Tito, a communist who desired
equality among all Yugoslav nations. In order to achieve this goal, Tito granted Kosovo
regional autonomy in the new constitution, leaving the province free to govern itself.
Throughout the World War years, ethnic tensions between Albanians and Serbs had
grown, with Albanians living in Kosovo receiving the harshest treatment. With Tito’s
reign over Yugoslavia, he promised to protect the Kosovar Albanians from continued
oppression; however, his efforts to do so were weak at best. The social and economic
status of Kosovo during the 1950s and early 1960s was poor compared to other Yugoslav
nations, and under the 1963 Yugoslav Constitution, Kosovo received the state of an

Autonomous Province which reduced the state’s previous amount of autonomy (Malcolm

1998).
The late 1960s brought about a different change, and Kosovo received additional
autonomy with the passage of Amendment XVIII, defining autonomous communities as
“socio-political communities” and requiring the state to act as a republic under Serbia
(Malcolm 1998). The 1974 Constitution added to that change, and power was finally
given back to the Kosovar Albanians. The state operated its own police force, bank, and
local assembly. For the first time in a long time, Kosovo appeared to be void of direct
Serbian rule; however, at the beginning of the new decade 1980 and the death of Tito,
Kosovo’s autonomy would come into question once again (Judah 2000). The 1980s
proved to be a decade of inter-ethnic conflict as Kosovar Albanians and Serbs lived
uneasily amongst each other, and Slobodan Milosevic rose to power.

Reasons for Movement
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Before becoming president of Yugoslavia, Milosevic staked his claim in Serbia as
the head of the Serbian Communist Party in the late 1980s. Shortly thereafter ,this proved
to be a devastating blow for Kosovo, as Milosevic’s chief goal was to attain a united
Serbia and later a Greater Serbia. In 1986, a draft of the memorandum from the Serbian

Academy of Sciences was published. The publishing of this memo would prove to be
catastrophic in Kosovo’s independence quest, as the document described the rising
oppression faced by Serbs in Kosovo as genocide. Milosevic denounced the
memorandum; however, unfortunately for Kosovo, the damage had already been done.

Serbia would not give up Kosovo (Judah 2000).
Although he was not elected as president of Serbia until 1990, Milosevic assumed
the position in May of 1989. On November 17, 1988, after holding rallies across Serbia

and Kosovo, Slobodan Milosevic visited Belgrade for yet another one, in hopes of
convincing those in attendance that, “Every nation has a love which eternally warms it
heart. For Serbia it is Kosovo. That is why Kosovo will remain in Serbia” qtd. in Judah
2000. Milosevic’s words soon became actions, and he quickly stripped Kosovo of all
autonomy, forcing the state under Serbian rule again; however, on July 2, 1991, the
Kosovo assembly made one last push for autonomy as they declared Kosovo’s
independence as a republic. Ibrahim Rugova led the Republic of Kosovo, although
Albania was the only nation to recognize the independent state (Malcolm 1998). Slowly,
through riots and violence and extreme oppression, Milosevic and the Serbs began to
cleanse Kosovo, a province in his homeland of Serbia, of its native people, the Kosovar
Albanians.
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Unfortunately for the Kosovar Albanians, those who longed for an independent
nation, the events at end of the twentieth century would only add to the conflict in the

Balkans, a part of the world already covered in the blood of conflict and ethnic cleansing.
War raged in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the mid-1990s, and by 1995, in an attempt to
bring peace to the region, the Dayton Accords were signed by the warring parties. The
peace treaty, however, failed to mention Kosovo, although many believed the document
gave legitimacy to ethnic territory (Independent International Commission on Kosovo
2000). The Dayton Accords showed that the international community was aware of the
conflict within the Balkans, yet oblivious to the increasingly desperate situation in
Kosovo. As the nation known as Yugoslavia dissolved, Kosovar Albanians lived in a

constant state of fear; they were being annihilated in their homeland and the world had
turned a blind eye (Campbell, 1999).
Throughout the years of strife, Kosovar Albanians appeared to be passive towards
Milosevic’s regime as Yugoslavia began to crumble. This was a part of Rugova’s plan,
remaining silent in hopes of regaining Kosovo’s autonomy (Judah 2000). While Rugova
pushed for passivity, another group took action. A group of exiled Albanian students
from the University of Prishtina organized in the mid-1980s as the Popular League for the
Republic of Kosovo (LPRK). Their dream was one in which Kosovo was free from

Serbia, an independent nation. The group studied other independence movements
happening across the world and learned from the experiences of other groups across the

world, including the Basque insurgents known as ETA (Perritt 2008).
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In the early 1990s, the LPRK changed its name to the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA). After a particularly devastating experience with the Serbian police, the KLA
reorganized and began to train and recruit Kosovar Albanians who believed in the
group’s cause, a free Kosovo. Initially, the KLA lacked money, money needed to
purchase weapons; however, as the organization began to mobilize, so did its wealth.
With the collapse of Albania in 1997, weapons suddenly became affordable, and for the
first time, the KLA’s dream of one Kosovo seemed to be a possibility (Michael Waller,
2001). Like many of the movements they had studied, the KLA used guerilla tactics to
intimidate their enemy, the Serbs. Dressed in black masks, the group attacked
sporadically which presented the Serbian police force with a challenge; group members

and future targets were difficult to identify, thus instilling a sense of fear in the Serbs

(Judah 2000).
The KLA considered themselves a separatist organization, and their desire for
independence conflicted with Milosevic’s plan for a unified Serbia. He yearned to
squelch the actions of the Kosovo Liberation Army, yet support for the organization

seemed to grow after each attack. In 1998, Milosevic took a firm stance against the
group, hoping to completely eliminate the KLA by initiating a siege at the home of Adem
Jashari, one of the group’s leaders. Rather than exterminating the KLA, Milosevic’s
actions only encouraged the group to mobilize even further. Much like other separatist
movements across the globe, the Kosovo Liberation Army did not target civilians; and in
fact, most citizens supported the group’s cause, believing that the KLA could cause
change where average citizens could not. The organization only targeted their enemy.
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The KLA’s guerilla tactics had evolved to army tactics, and Kosovo became a war zone
(Perritt 2008).
The world watched as the KLA and Serbs slaughtered each other. Finally, a
ceasefire was ordered in October of 1998; however, it did not last long and the violence

restarted by December (Perritt 2008). The last year of the millennium, 1999, brought
hope to the bloodied Balkans with the Rambouillet Conference. The conference
encouraged peace within Albania and peace within Kosovo, stating internal stability as
the pathway to peace in the Balkans. The Rambouillet Conference was what the world
powers believed to be the last chance for peace in the Balkans. Kosovars and Serbs
present at the conference were hesitant to commit to the proposals presented. Kosovars,
specifically Rugova, refused to accept any language surrounding the “territorial integrity

of Yugoslavia”, as they longed for independence. Serbs, specifically Milosevic, were
hesitant to agree upon any military intervention, as he longed to keep Kosovo intact with
Serbia. At the end of the Rambouillet Conference, Kosovo signed the peace agreement
while Serbia did not (Kosovo, 2000).
The Rambouillet Conference and subsequent peace documents did not end the

terror in the Balkans. The Serbs continued to infiltrate and surround Kosovar cities and
towns, killing those in their path. The world was watching, and because the Serbs chose
not to sign the agreement, further destruction, bombing led by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), ensued. On March 24, 1999, after several weeks of negotiations
and very little progress with Milosevic’s regime, the NATO airstrikes began in Kosovo.
NATO hoped the threat of destruction would encourage Milosevic to compromise, a
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necessary ingredient for peace in the Balkans (State, 1999). NATO only planned for the
bombing campaign to last for several days, thus displacing very few Kosovar Albanians.
Unfortunately, the organization’s initial estimates were wrong, and the campaign lasted
from March until June of 1999 with an astronomical number of refugees as a result
(Kosovo, 2000). The number of refugees from Kosovo increased by the thousands each
day as the international organization decimated the already battered heartland of the
Balkans, but on June 10, 1999, NATO’s campaign finally ended. However, Kosovo was

not yet independent and its autonomy had yet to be restored.
Kosovo’s independence movement: methods for achieving success

The members of the KLA had a dream, a dream of a free, independent Kosovo.
The group longed for the autonomy of previous decades, yet the guerilla tactics and

terrorism only caused more destruction as the international community got involved in
the conflict. Although later legislation would ask for the disarmament of the KLA, the
legacy started by the original Kosovar freedom fighters was clear: Kosovars wanted

independence and would press on towards that goal until it was met. On February 17,
2008, after years of oppression and fighting, Kosovo declared its independence from

Serbia (Kosovo MPs proclaim independence, 2008). The pathway to independence had
been paved years before, beginning with the end of NATO’s airstrike.
On June 10, 1999, the day NATO ended its bombing campaign in Kosovo, the
United Nations’ Security Council adopted Resolution 1244. The resolution was written to
prevent additional atrocities from occurring in Kosovo, as well as providing for an
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international presence in the area to ensure that Kosovo’s autonomy was restored.
Additionally, the provisions of the resolution include the disarmament of the KLA, the

recognition and implementation of the rights of all refugees, the restoration of autonomy
and self-administration in Kosovo. Resolution 1244 also provides for future talks to
determine the political status of Kosovo, acknowledging the proceedings of the
Rambouillett agreement. This resolution also specifically states that the territorial
integrity described in the Helsinki Accords will still be recognized (Council, 1999).

Shortly after Resolution 1244 was adopted by the UN Security Council, the
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established.
The ultimate goal of UNMIK is “to provide Kosovo with a “transitional administration
while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic selfgoverning institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all
inhabitants of Kosovo”

(United Nations, 2008). The mission is achieving these goals

through the implementation of the UNMIK Policy which works in conjunction with the
Kosovo Police Service to investigate crime and patrol the border. The UNMIK
Department of Justice also works with a Kosovar organization, the Kosovo Judicial
Council, to prosecute serious criminal offenses. UNMIK works with a variety of other
local organizations, and slowly, more responsibilities are being given back to the local
institutions (United Nations, 2008).
Perhaps the most influential aspect of UNMIK which assisted Kosovo in its
independence movement is the Democratization and Institution Building Pillar (OSCE).
Under OSCE, the United Nations established a democracy in Kosovo with the first
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elections held in 2001. The Kosovar government organized the 2007 elections, and OSCE
only offered technical support. The Kosovo Assembly was also instituted under the
watchful eye of OSCE (United Nations, 2008). UNMIK, specifically OSCE, taught
Kosovo how to effectively run Kosovo, a skill that was lost amongst the carnage during
the years of oppression. Resolution 1244 and UNMIK left the future status of Kosovo
unknown; however, Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari quickly turned the uncertainty into
certainty with what has come to be known as the Ahtisaari Plan.
The Ahtisaari Plan provides for an independent Kosovo. According to the plan,
Kosovo will govern under democracy, just as UNMIK instituted. A Constitution of

Kosovo will be written and adopted, and Kosovo’s economy should be a free market.
Ahtisaari’s plan allows for the creation of a national flag and the institution of a national
language. Under this plan, Kosovo would be free, independent from Serbia, acting as a

separate entity, one that Ahtisaari encouraged the rest of the world to recognize (Council,
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, 2007). Ahtisaari’s plan was
rejected by the Security Council on July 20, 2007; however, the foundation for Kosovar

independence had been laid (Country/Russia, 2007).
On acold February day in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, the sounds of

excitement, pure joy serenaded the city. Kosovo’s parliament declared the nation’s
independence from Serbia, a unanimous decision, on February 17, 2008. While the
decision did not come under the Ahtisaari Plan, the newly independent state plans to use
the document as a guide for their country. Many Kosovars never believed the day would
come when their state would be free. Kosovo’s independence was a dream come true for
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the Kosovar Albanians who suffered under Milosevic; however, while the Kosovars
rejoiced, the Serbs fumed. Kosovo’s independence was not a part of their plan.
Without the support of the international community, Kosovo’s independence
would still be just a dream rather than a reality. The international community supported
the idea of an independent Kosovo state long before February 17, 2008. NATO, UNMIK,
OSCE, and the Ahtisaari Plan displayed the international community’s support for
Kosovo’s independence. UNMIK and OSCE assisted Kosovars in establishing a local
government, a necessary institution of a free state. The Ahtisaari Plan mapped out
Kosovo’s plan for independence. The international community supported Kosovo’s fight
for independence in the early stages of the movement, ignoring Serbia’s plea for a united
Serbia. Kosovo’s transition to an independent nation came about in large measure due to
the international community’s support for the movement.
Without the support of the international community, Kosovo’s plight for
independence would not have been successful. Because the international community
supported Kosovo’s mission, the mission gained legitimacy. Without legitimacy, officials
cannot serve; without legitimacy, countries do not exist. Countries must be recognized,
legitimate, to have a voice in the international community. Without legitimacy, a country

does not exist in the international system. Legitimacy gives life to a country. Separatist
movements that desire independence need legitimacy; the movements need to be

recognized by the international community in order to achieve their goal of
independence. Countries with existing domestic separatist movements are hesitant to
support the independence of other independence movements, because giving legitimacy
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to one movement could lead to the assumption that the nation supports all movements,
including the domestic movement within its own borders.
An independent Kosovo would not exist without the assistance of NATO,
UNMIK, OSCE, and the Ahtisaari Plan. NATO ended Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing, and

thus, allowed for the creation of UNMIK, a program created under United Nations
Resolution 1244. UNMIK established an international presence within Kosovo while
teaching community officials how to effectively govern the state, a necessity for any area
that hopes to someday be an independent state. OSCE is a branch of UNMIK that has

worked within the state to promote democracy and human rights, each an important
aspect in becoming an independent nation. The Ahtisaari Plan, proposed to the United
Nations Security Council, detailed a pathway for Kosovo’s independence, although the
plan failed to gain support from Russia. Each of these organizations and plans assured
Kosovo that the international community would support an independent state, even if
Serbia did not. With each organization and each plan, the international community
prepared Kosovo to be an independent nation. These organizations recognize Kosovo’s
desire for independence, and through the use of various resolutions, assisted the state in
preparation for eventual independence, including government restructuring and
provisions for public works. The international community supported an independent
Kosovo well before the state became independent in the February 2008.
While Kosovar Albanians were filled with excitement and joy over their newly
freed country, the Serbs, inhabiting the land just north of Kosovo, were filled with anger.
Riots errupted in the streets of Belgrade, and hand grenades were launched at United
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Nations’ buildings. Just after Kosovo’s declaration of independence passed unanimously
in the Kosovo Assembly, the Serbs passed their own declaration, one proclaiming
Kosovo’s independence ‘null and void’. According to the Serbian parliament, Kosovo’s
declaration of independence was illegal, citing the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1244 and international law as the basis for that claim (Serbia 'annuls' Kosovo
independence, 2008). Vojislav Kostunica, Prime Minister of Serbia, called Kosovo a
“false state,” accusing the United States of violating international order to provide for its
own military pursuits (World Reaction Split on Kosovo, 2008).
The Serbian government, dismayed with Kosovo’s decision yet realizing its own
limitations, began exploring other options in hopes of reclaiming the land they believed
was theirs. In September of 2008, the United Nations agreed to hear Serbia’s case
concerning the legality of Kosovo’s independence. Serbs hope to have their case heard by
the International Court of Justice; however, the United Nations General Assembly must

vote before the case can be heard at the Hague (UN Board Backs Serbia's Kosovo Court

Bid, 2008) .
While Serbs continue to fight for one Kosovo under Serbia, the international community
clearly supports Kosovo’s bid for independence, regardless of the desires of the Serbs.
The Serbs are continuing to fight for the revocation of Kosovo’s independence bid,
creating a webpage found on the state’s government website entitled “Kosovo is Serbia.”

Now that Kosovo is independent, the Serbs must wait. The fate of Kosovo is in the hands
of the international community who has supported the state’s quest for independence all
along.
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Chapter [V: Exemplifying the Theory: Spain’s response to
Kosovo’s independence
While many European Union countries rushed to recognize Kosovo’s
independence, several countries were hesistant, including Spain. Within a day of
Kosovo’s referendum for independence, Spanish foreign minister, Miguel Angel
Moratinos, released a statement announcing Spain’s refusal to recognize Kosovo as an
independent nation. Several sources, including The New York Times, quoted Moratinos,
“The government of Spain will not recognize the unilateral act proclaimed yesterday by
the Assembly of Kosovo”

(Bilefsky, Kosovo Builds Economy From the Ground Up,

2008). Moratinos claimed that Kosovo’s actions violated international law, and for that
reason, Spain would not recognize Kosovo. Maria Teresa Fernandez de la Vega, Spanish
Deputy Prime Minister, also noted, “[Spain] does not support a unilateral declaration of
independence. It should have been in agreement with the various parties, which is not the
case, or in line with international standards, that is to say with a (UN) Security Council
resolution” (Europe split on Kosovo's independence, 2008).
Neither Moratinos nor de la Vega’s initial statements elaborated on Spain’s
refusal to acknowledge Kosovo’s independence; they merely stated that the nation’s

independence was a violation of international law. They did not mention the separatist
movement Spain was fighting within its borders; they did not mention ETA or the
Basques, a situation that at times has looked all too familiar to Kosovo’s (James, 2008).

In the days and weeks leading up to Kosovo’s declaration of independence, ETA and the
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Basques were watching the state’s every move, including interviewing those who led the
charge for Kosovo’s independence (ETA to follow Kosovo example, 2008). Miren
Azkarate, a spokewoman for the Basque Government, released a statement in response to
Kosovo’s declaration of independence, citing the move as “a new example in Europe in

which problems can be solved through democracy and dialogue, respecting citizens’ wish
[of self determination]” (EITB.com 2008). The Basques crave independence just like the
Kosovars did, and the Basques want the world’s approval with their independence
declaration, something Kosovo managed to achieve. Having the world’s approval will
give the Basques legitimacy, even if Spain never chooses to recognize the state.
Worldwide recognition and approval is imperative to the Basque Country’s success as an
independent nation. Spain’s stance was clear; the nation would not support Kosovo’s
independence.
The Spanish government never publically mentioned the Basques as one of the
nation’s reasons for refusing to support Kosovo’s independence; however, government
leaders from across the world, including the United States, wondered if Kosovo’s case
would set a precedent for other domestic independence movements.

During a House of

Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, Senator Eliot Engel of New York
argued that Kosovo’s independence would not set a precedent, describing Kosovo as a
unique case; however, Senator Dan Burton of Indiana offered a counter argument, one
that explains why Spain could not and did not support Kosovo’s independence, “[Serbs]
say that they had no problem with Kosovars governing themselves within the confines of
a greater Serbia, as they have always been, but when they become an independent nation,
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you are severing part of the sovereignty of Serbia” (Congress, 2008). The Basque region
of Spain is much like Kosovo was before becoming an independent nation, an
autonomous, self governing region, within Serbia.
The situation in Spain is not unlike the situation in Serbia. Spain is a democracy
in which a separatist movement exists, the Basques. The Basques, specifically ETA, are
desperate to separate from Spain, and after watching Kosovo’s quest for independence
unfold, the movement is now convinced that success is possible with the sympathy of the
international community. Spain wants to remain united, thus making the issue of the
Basques a very relevant electoral issue. President Zapatero was reelected in March 2008
because he chose to speak out against the Basque movement. Had Zapatero chosen to
support the Basque independence movement, he would not have been reelected. El
Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas performed a survey after the 2005 Basque
governmental elections asking voters if they would support an independent Basque
nation. Only thirty five percent of the surveyed population supported the idea (CIS 2005).
While ETA and other Basque Nationalists support the idea of an independent nation, the
Basque population as a whole does not. Because Zapatero wished to get reelected, he
needed to represent the opinion of the majority, a Basque country united under Spain.
All elected officials rely on the support of their constituents in order to be
reelected. Although a number of governments have made concessions to nationalist
movements, in general, domestic constituents do not support independence movements
with their nation. Separatist movements seek to create political and social unrest;
domestic constituents are averse to such instability. Unrest allows for chaos and fear, and
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thus, disrupts the way of life for those not supporting the separatist movement. The
majority faction of domestic constituencies elect officials who do not support separatist
movements. Government officials in Spain get reelected because they represent the
wishes of the greater Spanish population, a nation in which the Basques exist within
Spain rather than as a separate entity.
In addition to the national integrity wishes of the Spanish populace, Spain needs
the Basques as an autonomous community because the region is an integral part of the

Spain’s economy. By Franco’s death in 1975, the Basque region was the wealthiest
region in Spain. The Basques survived Franco’s oppression, and during that time,
managed to thrive economically, bolstering the country’s GDP (Hooper 1987). Spain is

currently facing the worst recession since 1993. Each area of the country is experiencing
the economic recession, even the Basques; however, the Basques are still providing Spain
with resources otherwise unavailable to the country, such as a access to the bigger
Atlantic ports. The Basque economic sector is still important to Spain, even in a time of
economic downfall (BBC 2009). Within Spain exists a movement that is all too similar to
the movement that existed within Serbia, and because Spain wishes to remain united as
one nation, the government will not support Kosovo.
Spain could not recognize Kosovo, unless it wished to give legitimacy to the
Basque separatist movement. In the fall of 2008, the Basque referendum for
independence was declared unconstitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court, an

action that reiterated Spain’s refusal to recognize the Basque independence movement.
Spanish recognition of Kosovo would give legitimacy to the Basque cause. While Spain
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stood against Kosovo’s independence, most of the European Union supported the new
state. The European Union encouraged its members to support Kosovo’s independence,
while acknowledging that several states like Spain would not support the world’s newest
country (Europe split on Kosovo's independence, 2008). International organizations often
help shape how states respond to international and domestic independence movements;
however, because the Basque independence movement is a critical electoral issue in
Spain, the Spanish government gave precendence to its domestic policies rather than
caving to the pressures of the international community.
The pressures from international organizations manifest in a variety of different
ways; however, in the case for Kosovo, the international community only encouraged
other nations to support the cause that many international organizations had been
supporting for years. The European Union strongly encouraged its member states to
recognize the newly independent nation, under the assumption that Kosovo may someday
apply to become a member of the organization. Spain politely refused, as the mere
thought of Basque independence proved to be horrifying. The Basque independence
movement in Spain is a critical electoral issue, one that elects and reelects officials term

after term. The opposition to the Basque independence movement keeps officials in
office. While the other parties have not expressly stated their views towards the Basque
independence movement, the Spanish Socialist Party, Zapatero’s party, has written in its

2008 resolutions that the party wishes to keep Spain united. In the party’s resolutions, the
group urges for cohesion among all Spaniards, encouraging the election of Socialists in
all of the autonomous communities (Espanol, 2008). Because the Socialist Party
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advocates a united Spain, all candidates from this party must take a firm stance against
the separatist movement within the Basque Country. The voters appear to support this
movement, as Zapatero was reelected as president in March of 2008.

Spain acknowledged the desires of the European Union; however, because of the
severity of the Basque separatist movement within its own borders, the nation ignored the
organization’s request. The Basque independence movement in Spain, a domestic policy
issue, took precendence over the European Union’s insistence that its member states
recognize Kosovo, a foreign policy issue. Spain, however, was not the only member state
of the European Union to ignore the organization’s request. Greece also balked at the
idea of recognizing Kosovo for the sake of pleasing the EU, and Russia refused to
acknowledge the state’s independence because of separatist movements.
The Greek foreign minister, Dora Bakoyannis, feared what the Spanish

government never verbalized, the fear of Kosovo becoming a precedent for other
European separatist movements. He argued that the recognition of one separatist
movement might lead to the recognition of others(Orth, 2008). For Greece, the threat of
additional conflict on their homefront is worrisome. Violent conflict has shown a
tendency to spread geographically, and Greece fears that conflict in neighboring states
could cause conflict within its own borders. The Greek Foreign Minister Dora
Bakoyannis stated, “whatever [Greece’s] decisions will be [concerning Kosovo’s

independence], they will be taken following a detailed examination of developments. A
focal position is held, however, by the recognition of the role of Serbia in securing
stability in the Balkans” (Greek Embassay 2008). The Greek government fears that
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Kosovo’s independence will set a precedent for future separatist movements, specifically
for the eventual international recognition of the Turkish Repubic of Northern Cyprus.
The area declared independence in 1983; however, the state has only been formally
recognized by Turkey (Times of India 2008). The Greek political parties are wary of

what could come of their homeland with the independence of Kosovo, “‘a negative
precedent is also being created for the issue of Cyprus” (Greek Embassy 2008). Greece
is placing their own domestic interests, the desire to remain out of conflict, before the
desires of the international community. Greece is well aware of what could become of the
Balkans should Kosovo’s independence set a precedent for separatist movements
worldwide; war could break out in the area once again, forcing Greece to pay a price the

nation never agreed upon.
Concerning the issue of Kosovo, Greece must be wary, as the issue of stability

within the region is of utmost importance. The Greeks realize that Kosovo’s
independence could create a domino effect, causing additional hostility and violence
within the region. Governments do not like chaos or violence as such outbreaks can cause

unrest within the government, leading to additional instability. Citizens do not like chaos
or violence, as such outcomes can infringe upon the rights of the citizens including the

right to life. Citizens expect elected officials to prevent chaos and violence, and therefore,
officials will not be reelected should they support any external movement that could lead
to the outbreak of violence and chaos, as in the case with Greece.

The Basques remain Spain’s proverbial thorn in the side, and the recognition of
Kosovo as an independent nation is only increasing the separatists’ desire for total
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independence. For Russia, Chechnya has proven to be its proverbial thorn, and much like
the Spaniards and Greeks, the Russians are refusing to acknowledge Kosovo’s
independence (Flintoff, 2008).

In 1991, Chechnya declared its independence from

Russia; however, in 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin decided to revoke that
independence and reclaimed Chechnya for Russia. The state continued to press for
independence, and in 1996, the war for independence began. Chechen independence was
granted; however, the Russians quickly regained control of the state again during the
second of two bloody wars (Q&A: The Chechen conflict, 2006). The Chechens, much
like the Basques, crave independence. Russian recognition of Kosovo’s independence
would give legitimacy to the independence movement within Chechnya.
In the aforementioned cases of Spain, Serbia, Greece, and Russia, each nation
desires to maintain their territorial integrity, and each state is willing to pay a high cost to
maintain that integrity. When something challenges this intergrity, like a separatist
movement, states must do what they can to prevent the creation of a slippery slope which
could cause the loss of their territory in the future. In the case of Greece, in which a
separatist movement does not exist, the threat to the state’s territorial integrity is indirect;

territorial integrity is of utmost importance to each state. Spain, Serbia, Greece, and
Russia all refused to recognize Kosovo. The recognition of Kosovo would create a

slippery slope, as a possible precedent for other separatist movements could be set.
Setting a precedent for separatist movements could cause the loss of territory for a state
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however, Greece continues to maintain the same position as the other nations, as

with a domestic separatist movement. States are willing to pay a high price to maintain
their territorial integrity.
Serbia was willing to pay a high price in order to hold onto Kosovo. The state was
willing to fight NATO, a powerful international alliance system, in hopes of keeping
Kosovo united under Serbia. In the eyes of the Serbian government, Kosovo is a part of
Serbia. Serbia believes that Kosovo is an essential portion of the state’s territory. Serbia
needs Kosovo to be a complete nation, as Kosovo has proven to be an integral part of
Serbia’s culture. The territorial integrity of a state is of the utmost importance, as without
land, governments cannot govern. While Serbia is not at risk of losing all of its territory,
the loss of Kosovo is a loss of territorial integrity. States are willing to pay a high price to
keep their territory, as shown in the case of the Basques.
Spain is desperate to keep the Basque country united under Spain, and the
government is willing to pay a high price to do so. Spain needs the Basque country, as the
Basques bolster the nation’s economy. The Basques provide additional economic
opportunity with its ports on the Atlantic coastline. The Basque country provides another
economic avenue for the Spanish government to explore. The area provides the state with
additional economic growth and independence, as the area has access to resources not
found in the rest of Spain. The Basque country draws tourists to Spain, as Frank Gehry’s
world renowned Guggenheim Museum sits along the river in Bilbao and San Sebastian
remains one of the world’s premiere surfing spots. The Basque cuisine also brings
visitors to Spain. The unique usage of spices and seafood is distinctive and entices
tourists from across the world to visit the Basque country just to taste the salted cod and
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Basque cream cake. Without the Basque country, Spain would not be complete and
would struggle to make up for the economic loss. Spain is willing to pay a high cost to
keep the Basque country under Spain.
For the last several years, Russia set a precedent concerning foreign independence
movements. The state refuses to formally recognize any separatist movement. Much like
Spain and the Basques, Russia desires to keep Chechnya as a part of Russia, rather than
an independent state. Any recognition of outside independence movements would give
legitimacy to the Chechen cause. For Russia, the desire of the international community,
worldwide recognition of Kosovo, is secondary to the domestic wants of the state. Russia
needs Chechnya like Spain needs the Basques, and neither country is willing to sacrifice
their nation’s wants for those of the international community. Chechnya is rich in oil, a
resource that Russia is desperate to have. Oil is a valuable commodity in the international
market, an obvious fact to both Russia and Chechnya. Russia needs Chechnya for the
economic benefits the territory provides through oil (BBC 2008). Each state’s domestic
policy shapes their foreign policy. Each state chooses to make domestic policy decisions
before making foreign policy decisions. Spain and Russia chose to make foreign policy
decisions, the refusal to recognize Kosovo, only after making domestic policy decisions,
refusing to allow for the independence of their domestic separatist movements.
Spain and Russia’s actions, their decisions to place their domestic policy desires
above the wants of the international community, shows how domestic policy affects

foreign policy. Nations choose to how to respond to international situations and the
subsequent international pressure according to their domestic policies. States act and
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Conclusion
According to the theory, domestic politics affects foreign policy decision making.
Countries act and react to situations in the international community according to their
domestic political situation. The wishes of domestic constituency supersede the wishes of
the international community, should the desires of the international community conflict
with the nation’s domestic wishes. This theory provides an adequate answer for how
domestic policy and foreign policy are connected. The desires of voting constituents keep
elected officials in office. Because elected officials wish to remain in office, the priorities
of the voting constituency take precedence over priorities of the international community.
With this theory, one gathers a better understanding of why countries act and react

to the various situations that arise within the international community. This is an
important lesson, as the actions taken by countries explain the relations that form in the
international community. Enemies and allies are created as a result of these actions and
reactions, and enemies and allies start wars and foster peace. Because of this, an

understanding of these relationships is crucial when studying the international
community. This theory provides another explanation of how these relationships form by
establishing how a country creates foreign policy as a result of domestic realities.
This theory adequately explains how domestic politics and foreign policy are
connected; whereas, other political philosophies, including realism and liberalism, could
not. By determining how domestic policy affects foreign policy, scholars can better
predict how states will react to future international situations. Should another separatist
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The theory Proposed by this thesis
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foreign policy decisions that run contrary to strong domestic political forces will
not
usually go unpunished. This theory adequately explains how domestic independ
ence
move ments affect the recognition of foreign independence movements.

54

APPENDIX

MAP #1

MAP OF EUROPE

(Greece-map.net)

55

wy
sa
ies‘. Seta

panne
RA|
EXTREMADU
se
RY

Lue

LAMANCHA
He

VALENCIA

LOS

Oe

fh

“3”

we

BALEARIC ISLANDS:

@ www.NativeSpain.com

you may reproduce this map as long as you keep this notice intact

(NativeSpain.com)

56

i

MAP #3
MAP OF SERBIA AND KOSOVO
Kae EET

~~ ape DAOM

ETT

co

i Repo O A eS Bie Wie Ag

UNC

tee ee

pats a a

e

Subotica

Vojvodina

Nae EU aea

Wes
Mayen
aoe
5

MON

<¢1.70
fA

ail
Kosovo

rs

funder UN interne
adderanietestion)

as

Aten.

“7 ALBANIA

[™

ae

r
|

FYROM

and Eastern Europe
© The Regional Emsironmental Center for Central
57

(Europe)

Bibliography
A year in the life of Kosovo. (2009). The Economist .
Bell, D. S. (1983). Democractic Politics in Spain: Spanish Politics after Franco. New
York: St. Matins Press, Inc.

Bilefsky, D. (5 de March de 2008). Kosovo Builds Economy From the Ground Up.
Recuperado el 14 de February de 2009, de The New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/05/world/europe/05kosovo.html
Bilefsky, D. (11 de January de 2008). U.S. and Germany Plan to Recognize Kosovo.
Recuperado el 14 de February de 2009, de The New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/1 1/world/europe/1 1kosovo.html?scp=8&sq=spain%20
kosovo&st=cse

Campbell, G. (1999). The Road to Kosovo: a Balkan Diary. Westview Press.
Caroline M. Hoxby, P. (1997). Heartland Policy Study, No. 82. The Heartland Institute.

Churiaque, J. I. (2006). A powerful financial tool: The economic agreement State
Government- Basque authorities. Bilbao: Fundacion para la Libertad.
Clark, R. P. (1984). The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980. The University of
Wisconsin Press: Madison.
Clark, R. P. (1979). The Basques: the Franco Years and Beyond. Reno: University of
Nevada Press.

Cohen, R. (14 de February de 2008). Here Comes Kosovo. Recuperado el 14 de February
de 2009, de The New York Times:

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/14/opinion/14cohen.html
Collins, R. (1986). The Basques. New York: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
Congress, O. H. (2008). The Balkans After the Independence of Kosovo and on the Eve
of NATO Enlargement. Committe on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives (pags. II57). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Council, U. N. (26 de March de 2007). Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status
Settlement.
Council, U. N. (10 de June de 1999). Resolution 1244.
58

Country/Russia. (July de 23 de 2007). Kosovo: Analyst Says Ahtisaari Plan Still Relevant
. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty .
Douglass, W. A., Urza, C., White, L., & Zulaika, J. (1999). Basque Cultural Studies.

Reno: Basque Studies Program: University of Nevada, Reno.
Douglass, W., & White, L. (2005). The Old Law of Bizkaia. Reno: Center for Basque
Studies: University of Nevada, Reno.
Embassy, G. (22 de February de 2008). Greece to brief UN mediator on response to
latest 'name issue’ proposal. Recuperado el 4 de March de 2009, de Hellenic Republic:
Embassy of Greece:
http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=3 &folder=361&a
rticle=22886

Espanol, P. S. (6 de July de 2008). PSOE.ES. Recuperado el 3 de March de 2009, de 37
Congreso Resoluciones:
http://www.psoe.es/ambito/saladeprensa/docs/index.do?action=View&id=205507
ETA to follow Kosovo example. (5 de January de 2008). Recuperado el 14 de February de

2009, de B92: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/worldarticle. php? yyyy=2008&mm=01 &dd=05&nav_id=46703
Europe split on Kosovo's independence. (18 de February de 2008). Recuperado el 14 de
February de 2009, de EurActiv.com: http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/europesplit-kosovo-independence/article-170353
Europe, R. E. (s.f.). Map of Serbia. Recuperado el 11 de March de 2009, de REC.org:
http://images. google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.rec.org/rec/maps/map_gif/serbia. gif
&imgrefurl=http://www.rec.org/rec/maps/sm_map.html&usg= _qAJIohyBwcOBCq9Njl
TOWMP_Haw=&h=457&w=400&sz=36&hl=en
&start=3 &sig2=bmPaBrqv-GRSINRS6T-aQ&um=1 &tbnid=mk9az71aKwpX0
Executive in Gasteiz has underlined that Kosovo's independence means "a new example
in Europe in which problems can be solved through democracy and dialogue, respecting
citizens’ wish". (17 de February de 2008). Recuperado el 14 de February de 2009, de
eitb.com: http://www.eitb24.com/new/en/B24_87000/politics/Basque-GovernmentKosovo-example-how-to-solve-problems/
Flintoff, C. (26 de February de 2008). Divisions Harden over Kosovo Independence.
Recuperado el 18 de February de 2009, de NPR:
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=1 9351545 &sc=emaf
59

Greece-map.net. (s.f.). Europe Map. Recuperado el 11 de March de 2009, de Greecemap.net: http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.greecemap.net/europe/europe-map.gif&imgrefurl=http://www.greecemap.net/europe.htm&usg=_ F6ODM8Y_GUFthK44dhilKDJoLu60=&h=482&w=644&sz
=52&hl=en&start=15 &sig2=FEdTZqvZYEOpo_zGX9IxA&um=1 &tbnid=Fo4KUi97JEEXRM
Hall, R. C. (2000). The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913: prelude to the First World War.
London: Routledge.
Henry H. Perritt, J. (2008). Kosovo Liberation Army. Chicago: University of Illinois.
Heywood, P. (1999). Politics and Policy in Democractic Spain. London: Frank Cass
Publishers.
Hooper, J. (1987). The New Spaniards. New York : Penguin.
Hupchick, D. P. (2002). The Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism. New York:
Palgrave.
India, T. T. (2 de February de 2008). EU states vow not to recognise Kosovo's
independence bid. Recuperado el March de 4 de 2009, de The Times of India:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2750282.cms?
frm=mailtofriend
Israely, J. (19 de February de 2008). Why Kosovo Divides Europe. Recuperado el 14 de
February de 2009, de Time.com:
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1714413,00.html

James, S. (2008). EU Reactiosn to Kosovo's Independence: The Lessons for Scotland.
The Constitution Unit.
José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. (26 de June de 2008). Recuperado el October de 2008, de
Centro de Investigacion de Relaciones Internacionales y Desarrollo:
http://www.cidob.org/es/documentacion/biografias_lideres_politicos/europa/espana/jose_
luis rodriguez_zapatero
Judah, T. (2000). Kosovo: War and Revenge. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Kant, I. (1795). Perpetual Peace: a Philosophical Sketch.
Kem, S. (29 de February de 2008). Kosovo balkanizes Europe. Recuperado el 14 de
February de 2009, de International Relations and Security Network:
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/content/view/full/1 15?id=54198%26Ing=en
60

Kosovo independence reverberates worldwide. (19 de February de 2008). Recuperado el
14 de February de 2009, de Los Angeles Times:
http://articles. latimes.com/2008/feb/19/world/fg-kosovo19
Kosovo MPs proclaim independence. (17 de February de 2008). BBC News: Europe .
Kosovo receives recognition boost. (10 de October de 2008). BBC News: Europe .
Kosovo, controversially free at last. (2008). The Economist .
Kosovo, T. I. (2000). Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Kurlansky, M. (1999). The Basque History of the World. New York: Penguin Group.
Lekic, S. (18 de February de 2008). Serbian president rejects Kosovo independence

declaration. AdelaideNow .
Literacy, N. A. (s.f.). Fast Facts. Recuperado el 22 de April de 2008, de National Center
for Education Statistics: http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=69
Madrigal, O. C. (2004). Zapatero: Presidente a la Primera. Spain: La Esfera de los
Libros.
Malcolm, N. (1998). Kosovo. New York: New York University Press.
Marco, S. Q. (2006). Esp@na: manual de civilizacion. Madrid: Edelsa Grupo Didascalia.
Mead, S. (9 de January de 2008). FY2008 Budget Cuts Early Education Funding. The
Early Ed Watch Blog . New America Foundation.
Mees, L. (2003). Nationalism, Violence, and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities.
New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Michael Waller, K. D. (2001). Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion. London: Frank Cass.
NativeSpain.com. (s.f.). Map of Spain with Regions. Recuperado el 11 de March de 2009,
de NativeSpain.com:
http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.nativespain.com/files/native/picture
s/regional-map-ofspain. gif&imgrefurl=http ://crosswordcomer.blogspot.com/2008/12/friday-december-192008-allan-e-parrish.html&usg= __3zfszS41JVcvOOUfxjdnVskm9NU=&h=468&w

61

Norden, P. (25 de August de 2000). Basque separatists step up terrorist activities.
Recuperado el October de 2008, de World Socialist Web Site:
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/aug2000/eta-a25.shtml
Opponents of Kosovo Independence Fear Separatist Reaction. (12 de November de
2007). Recuperado el 14 de February de 2009, de Deutsche Welle: http://www.dwworld.de/dw/article/0,2144,2998982,00.html
Orth, S. (22 de February de 2008). Breakaway Role Model: Separatist Movements Seek
Inspiration in Kosovo. Recuperado el 18 de February de 2009, de Spiegel International
Online: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,537008-2,00.html

Peace, U. S. (2003). Kosovo Decision Time: How and When? United States Institute of
Peace, (pags. 1-6). Washington, DC.
Perez Fernandez, J., & Hernando, J. (2004). Spain in Perspective: An Introduction to its
History, Art and Culture. Granada: Universidad de Granada.
“POSTELECTORAL DEL PAIS VASCO.." Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas. 22
Apr 2006. 21 Apr 2009 <http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/Archivos/Marginales/2600_2619/2601/e260100.html>.
Power, S. (29 de February de 2008). Ghosts of Kosovo. Recuperado el 14 de February de
2009, de Time: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1718556,00.html

Purvis, D. A. (10 de December de 2007). At An Impasse Over Kosovo. Recuperado el 14
de February de 2009, de Time:

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599, 1693074,00.html
Q&A: Kosovo's future. (11 de July de 2008). BBC News: Europe .
Q&A: The Chechan conflict. (10 de July de 2006). Recuperado el 26 de February de
2008, de BBC News: Europe: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3293441.stm
Regions and Territories: Chechnya. (11 de December de 2008). Recuperado el 11 de
March de 2009, de BBC News: Europe:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/2565049.stm
Serb president urgest World Court ruling on Kosovo. (11 de September de 2008). USA
Today .
Serbia ‘annuls' Kosovo independence. (18 de February de 2008). Recuperado el 1 de
February de 2009, de RTE News: http://www. rte.ie/news/2008/0218/kosovo.html
62

Serbian press mistrusts Kosovo plan. (2007). BBC News: Europe .
Solsten, E., & Meditz, S. W. (1988). Spain: A Country Study. Washington, D.C. : Library
of Congress.
Sowards, S. W. (12 de May de 2005). Lecture 18: Balkan politics drift to the nght.
Twenty-Five Lectures on Modern Balkan History (The Balkans in the Age of
Nationalism) . East Lansing, Michigan, United States of America: Michigan State
University.
State, U. S. (21 de May de 1999). Timeline of events 1989-1999 relating to the crisis in
Kosovo. Kosovo Chronology . Washington, DC: Department of State.
The Associted Press. (18 de February de 2008). Britain and France recognize Kosovo;
Spain and other EU nations opposed. Recuperado el 14 de February de 2009, de
International Herald Tribune: http://www. iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/18/europe/EUKosovo.php
The Spanish Electoral System- Historical Accident. (s.f.). Recuperado el October de
2008, de ACE- the Electoral Knowledge Project: http://aceproject.org/aceen/topics/es/esy/esy_es
UN Board Backs Serbia's Kosovo Court Bid. (18 de September de 2008). Recuperado el
1 de February de 2009, de BalkanInsight.com:
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/13226/
United Nations. (June de 2008). United Nations in Kosovo.
Who are ETA? (17 de November de 2008). Recuperado el November de 2008, de BBC
News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3500728.stm
Wood, D. B. (7 de December de 2007). Talks on Kosovo Hit a Dead End, Rice Says.
Recuperado el 14 de February de 2009, de The New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/08/world/europe/08kosovo.html
Woodward, R. (17 de February de 2008). Serbia condemns breakaway Kosovo as "false
state". Reuters .
World Reaction Split on Kosovo. (18 de February de 2008). Recuperado el 1 de February
de 2009, de Spiegel Online International:

http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,535935,00.html

63

